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**GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT**

Washington, D.C. 20451

November 28, 1984

Dear Director Casey:

Enclosed is the final version of the General Advisory Committee's Report, A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983.

This version has been forwarded to the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence by the President. We would greatly appreciate your returning to us the draft of the Report we provided last December.

Sincerely,

*William R. Graham*

William R. Graham  
Chairman

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The Honorable  
William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence



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### (U) PREFACE FOR READERS of the CONGRESSIONAL VERSION OF THE REPORT

(U) On December 1, 1983 the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament submitted to the President its report, A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices under Arms Control Commitments: 1958 - 1983 (U), in two volumes, containing twenty-two pages of introductory material and 275 pages, including 13 figures, 6 tables, 3 maps, and 28 photographs.

(U) The version of the report prepared for transmittal to the Congress of the United States contains the entire two-volume text, with all of the figures, tables, maps, and photographs. The Committee made only two sets of changes.

(U) The first set incorporates changes in classification indicators and text to protect specific sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Every reader should realize that the report, even with these textual changes, contains much intelligence information of a sensitive nature. Disclosure of this material could result in damage to U.S. intelligence and verification capabilities.

(U) The second set of changes incorporates corrections of typographical errors or facts which were unknown to us at the time of original publication. Paragraphs containing factual changes are designated by indicator (\*\*) at end of text. None of these changes materially affects the findings of the appropriate section of the report.

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Consultants to the Committee: William R. Harris, on leave from The Rand Corporation; and Amrom H. Katz, former Assistant Director for Verification at ACDA. They are owed the particular gratitude of the General Advisory Committee for their long and knowledgeable help on all aspects of the report.

(U) While each of the above persons and organizations contributed to the generation of this report, their assistance should not be interpreted as conveying an endorsement of the material herein. The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament assumes full responsibility for the contents.

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**NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

(U) This document is the product of a review by the General Advisory Committee on Arms control and Disarmament. It seeks to provide a comprehensive historical basis for understanding and anticipating Soviet conduct related to compliance with arms control commitments.

(U) Arms control has been widely regarded as an ameliorating influence on the dangers of existence in an armed world. However, the Committee finds that Soviet conduct contradicts widely held expectations of deliverance from danger through arms control.

(S) Aspects of Soviet conduct related to about half of their documentary arms control commitments were found to constitute material breaches of contracted duties. Soviet conduct has ranged from presumptive derelictions to persistent and comprehensive actions that are difficult to account for except as products of a deliberate intention to subvert the central purposes of arms control as sought by the U.S.

(S) Soviet conduct related to the remaining half of their documentary arms control commitments--those involving a mutuality of interest with other nations--remains in apparent compliance with contracted duties. (See the table at end of summary.)

(U) The shortcomings and deviations pertain to limitations on quantity, quality, testing and deployment of various types of instrumentalities of warfare bearing on military balance. These are grouped in the report as SALT-related and not SALT-related.

(U) The following table summarizes those SALT-related acts that the Committee considers to comprise material breaches for which we have high confidence in the reliability of the data.

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